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                                                                            NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3210 
_____________ 
 
MARK D. DEHAINAUT, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-10-cv-00899 
District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 30, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  July 25, 2012) 
 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Mark D. DeHainaut, who was an associate professor at California University of 
Pennsylvania (CALU), taught on-line and on-campus courses from 2002 to 2007.  In 
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April of 2008, he suffered a hemorrhagic stroke, which limited his activities of daily 
living.  As a result, he sought an accommodation from CALU that would enable him to 
teach only on-line courses.  CALU declined to provide the accommodation.  Thereafter, 
DeHainaut commenced this civil action in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  He asserted several claims, including a claim under 
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, against CALU and the Pennsylvania State 
System of Higher Education (PSSHE).  A motion to dismiss resulted in the filing of an 
amended complaint, which alleged disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of 
the Rehabilitation Act.  After an initial case management conference, the case proceeded 
to mediation. 
 The mediator explored the expectations of the parties and the merits of 
DeHainaut’s claims.  As the mediation session concluded, DeHainaut’s counsel prepared 
a handwritten document entitled “MEMO OF AGREEMENT.”  It set forth the terms of 
the settlement reached by the  parties and the date of the mediation.  The document was 
signed by DeHainaut, his wife (even though she was not a party to the lawsuit), his 
counsel, and counsel for CALU and the PSSHE.  The terms set forth a formula for 
calculating an award of back wages, provided that CALU would cooperate with 
DeHainaut’s application for disability retirement, which would entitle him to health care 
benefits commensurate with any other retiree, required the execution of a release and 
settlement agreement, established that DeHainaut’s employment would terminate at the 
conclusion of the 2010-2011 academic year and that he would not apply for further 
employment, and obligated CALU to pay for the cost of the mediation.   
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 Several days later, counsel for CALU and the PSSHE advised DeHainaut’s 
counsel of the back pay award calculated under the formula.  To the surprise of both 
counsel, the amount was lower than the $35,000 figure contemplated by CALU at the 
mediation.  Nonetheless, counsel advised that CALU and the PSSHE were willing to 
tender that amount plus an additional sum to reach the $35,000 figure it had envisioned 
the formula would yield.  DeHainaut was not receptive to the news, and he eventually 
retained new counsel.  CALU and PSSHE then filed a motion to enforce the settlement.  
At a hearing on the motion before the District Court, the mediator and DeHainaut’s 
former counsel testified about the mediation proceeding.  According to the mediator, 
although DeHainaut and his wife “grudgingly” signed the agreement, he was of the belief 
that a settlement had been reached. 
 After consideration of the record, the District Court granted the motion to enforce 
the settlement.  It found that the “parties entered into an agreement at the mediation 
session on March 4, 2011, the material terms of which were agreed upon by both parties 
and memorialized in the Memo of Agreement written by [DeHainaut’s] then counsel, and 
are sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced.”  [A13]  The Court noted that the 
settlement varied from DeHainaut’s subjective expectations, but that he “grudgingly” 
agreed to the terms.  The Court rejected DeHainaut’s contention that he was forced to 
sign the document before he could leave the mediation, finding credible the testimony of 
DeHainaut’s former counsel to the contrary.  The Court concluded that the signatures of 
DeHainaut and his wife demonstrated that they “understood at that moment that the 
resolution of the litigation had been reached.”   
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 This timely appeal followed.1
 We apply Pennsylvania state law to the enforceability of the parties’ settlement 
agreement.  Id. at 1033.  In Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1999), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that: 
  Because the District Court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, we review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error, and 
conduct plenary review of the issues of law.  See Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1991).   
The enforceability of settlement agreements is governed by principles of 
contract law.  To be enforceable, a settlement agreement must possess all of 
the elements of a valid contract.  As with any contract, it is essential to the 
enforceability of a settlement agreement that the minds of the parties should 
meet upon all the terms, as well as the subject-matter, of the [agreement].  
Where the parties have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact 
that they intend to formalize their agreement in writing but have not yet 
done so does not prevent enforcement of such agreement.  
 
Id. at 536 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  After review of the record 
before us, we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the parties 
had reached an agreement at the mediation session.  We appreciate DeHainaut’s assertion 
that the District Court erred in finding that the parties had resolved their dispute as the 
key terms of the settlement, i.e., the amount of the back pay to be paid and the provision 
of medical benefits, had yet to be definitively determined.  Nonetheless, we will not 
disturb the District Court’s finding because the Court explained that the agreement 
concerned the formula to be used in computing the back pay award and the mechanism 
by which DeHainaut could pursue the desired medical coverage.   
                                              
1  The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have final order 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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DeHainaut also contends that the District Court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that the Memo of Agreement was sufficiently definite to constitute an 
enforceable agreement.  In DeHainaut’s view, the Memo of Agreement failed to establish 
the key terms of the settlement, the amount of the back pay award and the continuation of 
medical coverage.  We agree that the absence of these terms in some circumstances might 
preclude a determination that the material terms of an agreement had been reached by the 
parties.  But under the circumstances before us, where what the parties agreed to was a 
formula to utilize in calculating the back pay and a means to pursue a continuation of 
medical coverage, we find no error by the District Court in concluding that the Memo of 
Agreement contained the necessary elements of a contract.   
DeHainaut further challenges the District Court’s order enforcing the settlement 
on the ground that CALU and PSSHE did not have requisite authority to settle the 
dispute.  This issue was not raised in the District Court and we will not consider it for the 
first time on appeal.  See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 
932 (3d Cir. 1976).   
Finally, DeHainaut asserts that because this settlement is of a claim that his civil 
rights were violated, CALU and PSSHE must demonstrate that he executed the Memo of 
Agreement knowingly and voluntarily.  Appellant’s Br. at 39 (citing W.B. v. Matula, 67 
F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995) (overruled on other grounds)).  The District Court’s 
Memorandum Opinion demonstrates that it fully considered the totality of the 
circumstances and concluded that the circumstances demonstrated that DeHainaut knew 
he was signing a settlement and that the terms were not as favorable as those for which he 
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had hoped.  The voluntariness of DeHainaut’s execution is further supported by the 
District Court’s finding that his former counsel credibly testified that DeHainaut was not 
forced to sign the Memo of Agreement in order to leave the mediation session. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting the 
motion to enforce the settlement. 
 
